Runtime Isolation
Each sandbox runs its own Linux kernel in its own virtual machine. Hardware virtualization, not a shared kernel, separates the sandbox from the host and from every other sandbox. Root inside the sandbox is root in that virtual machine only. The host also confines each virtual machine as an unprivileged process with access to its own sandbox’s files only. CPU and memory are hard limits on the virtual machine. Disks are created at their full size. A sandbox that fills its workspace receivesENOSPC, and a request above the allowed sizes is refused, never reduced. See Composition.
A clone, fork, or restore receives a new machine ID, new SSH host keys, and new entropy before user code resumes. Two sandboxes started from one snapshot never share an identity or a random number sequence.
Network Isolation
Outbound, inbound, and sandbox-to-sandbox traffic are controlled separately.
The platform deny set applies under every egress mode, and no
allow_out entry overrides it.
10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12, and192.168.0.0/16169.254.0.0/16, which includes cloud metadata addresses100.64.0.0/10- The host’s own public address
Organization Isolation
Every sandbox, template, and snapshot belongs to one organization. Every request carries an API key or a token for one organization. The control plane and the data plane both answer only with that organization’s resources. A request from another organization receives404 for a sandbox ID it does not own.
A fork or a snapshot copies a sandbox’s live state into sandboxes of the same organization only.
Secrets stay outside the sandbox. A secret rule keeps the value on the host, which sets the header in outbound HTTPS requests to the hosts the rule names. A placeholder copied out of a sandbox resolves nowhere else.