> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://developers.telnyx.com/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Isolation

Sandboxes are isolated by default. Every sandbox is a separate virtual machine, and the platform treats all code in it as hostile.

| Boundary | What Is Separated | Mechanisms |
| - | - | - |
| Runtime | Processes, memory, kernel, devices, and disks | A separate virtual machine per sandbox, with hard CPU, memory, and disk limits |
| Network | Traffic between a sandbox and the host, other sandboxes, private networks, and the internet | A separate network per sandbox, with a platform deny set and the sandbox's own egress mode |
| Organization | Sandboxes, templates, snapshots, and secrets of different accounts | A token bound to one organization on every request |

## Runtime Isolation

Each sandbox runs its own Linux kernel in its own virtual machine. Hardware virtualization, not a shared kernel, separates the sandbox from the host and from every other sandbox. Root inside the sandbox is root in that virtual machine only.

The host also confines each virtual machine as an unprivileged process with access to its own sandbox's files only.

CPU and memory are hard limits on the virtual machine. Disks are created at their full size. A sandbox that fills its workspace receives `ENOSPC`, and a request above the allowed sizes is refused, never reduced. See [Composition](https://developers.telnyx.com/docs/edge-compute/sandboxes/composition.md#size).

A clone, fork, or restore receives a new machine ID, new SSH host keys, and new entropy before user code resumes. Two sandboxes started from one snapshot never share an identity or a random number sequence.

## Network Isolation

Outbound, inbound, and sandbox-to-sandbox traffic are controlled separately.

| Direction | Default | Controls |
| - | - | - |
| Outbound | The internet is reachable. Private ranges and the platform are not. | `network.egress`, `network.allow_out`, and [secret rules](https://developers.telnyx.com/docs/edge-compute/sandboxes/organization-resources/secrets.md) |
| Inbound | Any port is reachable on its port URL. | `network.public_traffic` and the traffic token. See [Ports](https://developers.telnyx.com/docs/edge-compute/sandboxes/out-of-band-access/ports.md). |
| Sandbox to sandbox | Blocked | None. Two sandboxes reach each other only through port URLs. |

The platform deny set applies under every egress mode, and no `allow_out` entry overrides it.

* `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, and `192.168.0.0/16`
* `169.254.0.0/16`, which includes cloud metadata addresses
* `100.64.0.0/10`
* The host's own public address

TCP port 25 is blocked to every destination. The sandbox has no IPv6, and DNS resolves public names only. See [Network Limits](https://developers.telnyx.com/docs/edge-compute/sandboxes/common-control-plane/network-limits.md) for the egress modes.

## Organization Isolation

Every sandbox, template, and snapshot belongs to one organization. Every request carries an API key or a token for one organization. The control plane and the data plane both answer only with that organization's resources. A request from another organization receives `404` for a sandbox ID it does not own.

A fork or a snapshot copies a sandbox's live state into sandboxes of the same organization only.

Secrets stay outside the sandbox. A [secret rule](https://developers.telnyx.com/docs/edge-compute/sandboxes/organization-resources/secrets.md) keeps the value on the host, which sets the header in outbound HTTPS requests to the hosts the rule names. A placeholder copied out of a sandbox resolves nowhere else.
